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Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: The Effect of
Article 2315.6
INTRODUCTION
Should one be able to recover for the negligent infliction of emotional
distress? Suppose a motorist is driving down the road in a careful fashion
and suddenly an oncoming vehicle swerves into his lane. Veering to the
right to avoid the oncoming vehicle, the motorist hits a pedestrian walking
on the side of the road. The pedestrian is thrown through the motorist's
windshield at which time the pedestrian's head is severed and lands in
the motorist's lap. The motorist suffers no physical injuries, but because
of his involvement in the traumatic event, he suffers severe psychological
problems, hampering his ability to work and care for his family and
requiring extensive psychiatric treatment. Can he recover from the on-
coming motorist who swerved into his lane?
Before answering, consider this: instead of the motorist hitting a
pedestrian and suffering severe psychological harm; he hits a telephone
pole and is paralyzed from the neck down. Can he recover from the
oncoming motorist who swerved into his lane?
Is there any reason why the motorist in the second hypothetical should
recover for his physical injuries while the motorist in the first hypothetical
should not recover for his mental injuries?
In 1991, the Louisiana Legislature passed Civil Code article 2315.6.
The article provides a cause of action for mental anguish or emotional
distress for injury to another, while limiting who may recover and under
what circumstances. The purpose of this comment is to determine the
scope of Article 2315.6 and its impact on Louisiana's law regarding the
negligent infliction of emotional distress. The author concludes that Article
2315.6 applies to "bystander recovery" only and not to "traditional"
recovery for emotional distress-which includes the above hypo.
The comment is divided into several sections and subsections. Section
I provides an overview of Article 2315.6 and the problems presented in
determining its impact on the most pertinent cases involving negligent
infliction of emotional distress. Section II presents Louisiana's jurispru-
dential history of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Section III
analyzes the issues created by the article and suggests possible solutions
to the problems recognized in Section I. Subsection A of Section III
discusses the scope of Article 2315.6. Subsection B examines the legislative
history and the language of Article 2315.6. Subsection C discusses policy
considerations in allowing recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. Subsection D sets forth a continuum of recovery under Article
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2315.6, and Subsection E summarizes its application. Section IV discusses
the effects of the solutions proposed. Subsection A addresses each of the
article's requirements for bystander recovery and Subsection B considers
the directions the court may take in interpreting Article 2315.6 in relation
to the hypothetical situation presented. Finally, Section V concludes with
some observations and a summation of the problems, with the current
state of the law.
I. OVERVIEW
The rule in Louisiana has always been that a plaintiff could recover
for negligent infliction of emotional distress if the defendant owed a direct
duty to the plaintiff, there was a breach of that duty, and the mental
anguish was genuine.' However, prior to 1990, beginning with Black v.
Carrollton Railroad Co.,2 one generally could not recover for her own
mental anguish for injury to another. Then, in 1990, the Louisiana
Supreme Court overruled 135 years of jurisprudence and allowed one to
recover for her own mental anguish caused by injury to another, in the
landmark case of Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital.' However, the court
imposed restrictions on this "bystander recovery." These restrictions were
1) the claimant must view the accident which caused injury to the other
or come upon the scene soon thereafter; 2) the mental anguish must be
reasonable; 3) the mental anguish must be serious and foreseeable; and
4) the claimant must have a close relationship with the person injured-
i.e., the direct victim. 4 The court did not specifically list the close rela-
tionship required, but rather, left open "for another day" exactly which
close relationships met the requirement.'
Following Lejeune, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided Clomon v.
Monroe City School Board.6 In Clomon, the driver of an automobile
1. See infra text accompanying notes 14-66.
2. 10 La. Ann. 33 (1855).
3. 556 So. 2d 559 (La. 1990).
4. In their entirety, the Lejeune requirements read:
1) A claimant . .. must . .. either view the accident or injury-causing event or
come upon the accident scene soon thereafter and before substantial change has
occurred in the victim's condition.
2) The direct victim of the traumatic injury must suffer such harm that it can
reasonably be expected that one in the plaintiff's position would suffer serious
mental anguish from the experience.
3) The emotional distress sustained must be both serious [severe and debilitating]
and reasonably foreseeable to allow recovery.
4) The fourth restriction concerns the relationship of the claimant and the direct
victim [the court declined to determine what relationship was necessary, stating
that a husband-wife relationship is clearly sufficient).
Id. at 570.
5. Id.
6. 572 So. 2d 571 (La. 1990).
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was allowed to recover for the mental anguish she suffered from hitting
a boy (to whom she was not related) with her car due to the defendant's
negligence. The court stated that Lejeune did not apply because it "does
not govern every class of claim for emotional damage due to third party
injury'," but rather "only the most typical class, a suit by a plaintiff...
on a breach of the [defendant's] general duty of due care." ' 7 The Clomon
court then based its decision allowing recovery on the breach of a direct,
special statutory duty the defendant owed the plaintiff.'
Justice Hall's concurrence further reiterates the distinction between
Lejeune and Clomon. In Clomon the plaintiff was a participant, whereas
in Lejeune the plaintiff was a bystander. In relation to this, Justice Hall
sees a further distinction: while a bystander suffers emotional distress
from witnessing an injury to another person, a participant in an accident
suffers emotional distress from being involved in a traumatic ordeal, and
the emotional distress arising from that ordeal should be compensable.9
After Clomon, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal decided
Guillory v. Arceneaux.'0 Guillory involved an accident in which someone
was killed as a result, in part, of a third party's negligence." The plaintiff
was involved in the accident and sought to recover for her own emotional
distress. The court stated that Lejeune did not apply because the plaintiff
was not a bystander but a participant and that Clomon did not apply
because there was no breach of a direct, special statutory duty. Never-
theless, the court cited Justice Hall's concurrence in Clomon, in its entirety,
and held that the plaintiff did have a cause of action, based upon the
defendant's breach of his general duty of care. 2
Then, on July 19, 1991, the Louisiana Legislature passed Louisiana
Civil Code article 2315.6,13 which reads:
A. The following persons who view an event causing injury to
another person, or who come upon the scene of the event soon
thereafter, may recover damages for mental anguish or emotional
distress that they suffer as a result of the other person's injury:
(1) The spouse, child or children, and grandchild or grand-
children of the injured person, or either the spouse, the child
or children, or the grandchild or grandchildren of the injured
person.
7. Id. at 575.
8. Id. at 578.
9. Id. at 579.
10. 580 So. 2d 990 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
11. Id. at '991. The plaintiff's petition is assumed to be true for purposes of the
exception of no cause of action.
12. Id. at 995.
13. 1991 La. Acts No. 782, § 1.
1992]
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(2) The father and mother of the injured person, or either
of them.
(3) The brothers and sisters of the injured person or any of
them.
(4) The grandfather and grandmother of the injured person,
or either of them.
B. To recover for mental anguish or emotional distress under this
Article, the injured person must suffer such harm that one can
reasonably expect a person in the claimant's position to suffer
serious mental anguish or emotional distress from the experience,
and the claimant's mental anguish or emotional distress must be
severe, debilitating, and foreseeable. Damages suffered as a result
of mental anguish or emotional distress for injury to another
shall be recovered only in accordance with this Article.
While Article 2315.6 answers the question Lejeune left "for another
day," it raises many uncertainties. How does Article 2315.6 affect recovery
for negligent infliction of emotional distress in bystander cases and tra-
ditional cases? Was it meant to have any affect on traditional theories
of recovery? Is it merely legislative approval of Lejeune? Does it overrule
Clomon and Guillory by restricting recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional distress in all circumstances only to close relatives, or should
traditional theories of recovery be applied to these cases? Does it leave
room for Clomon's direct, special statutory duty analysis? If Clomon is
legislatively overruled, does Justice Hall's concurrence, adopted in Guil-
lory, present an alternative theory under which recovery may be granted?
At first glance it may seem that Article 2315.6 overrules Clomon and
Guillory. However, upon closer examination, one may conclude that it
does not. There are basically two categories of cases allowing recovery
for emotional distress: 1) traditional cases where defendant's negligence
is aimed directly at the plaintiff, and 2) bystander recovery cases where
the defendant's negligence is aimed at a third person and the plaintiff
suffers emotional distress from having viewed the injury, as in Lejeune.
Article 2315.6 deals solely with bystander recovery and does not interfere
with traditional theories of negligent infliction of emotional distress. The
Clomon/Guillory situation is, in reality, a traditional type of emotional
distress case and not a bystander recovery situation. Therefore, that type
of case should be analyzed according to traditional theories. Thus, Article
2315.6 does not overrule Clomon or Guillory and our motorist in the
above hypo would have a cause of action. Alternatively, Justice Hall's
theory-that the claimant's injury is not from "injury to another" but
from his participation in the accident-may be adopted and, if so, Article
2315.6 is again inapplicable.
II. THE LOUISIANA JURISPRUDENCE
The seminal case in Louisiana in the area of negligent infliction of
emotional distress and, more specifically, recovery for mental anguish as
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a result of injury to a third person is Black v. Carroilton Railroad Co.' 4
Black involved a train wreck caused by the Carrolton Railroad Company's
negligence. A fourteen-year-old boy who was a passenger on the train
suffered two broken legs. His father, not a passenger, attempted to recover
for his own damages. 5
The jury awarded damages for "the shock to the parental feelings,
and the solicitude and anxiety of the parents.' ' 6 The Louisiana Supreme
Court overruled the trial court, holding that vindictive damages 7 are
limited to the direct victim, and thus a third party may not recover.'9
The court stated, "[W]e do not understand the object of the law to be,
the punishment of an offending party for having been the cause of
unpleasant emotions in the family and acquaintances of the party of-
fended." 9
The Black rule was considered again and followed by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in three cases early in this century.20 Black remained the
law for 135 years until 1990 when it was overruled by the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital.2' During this 135-year span,
however, there were several cases in which recovery for negligent infliction
of emotional distress was allowed-some involving injury to third persons2
and some not.23 These "traditional" cases of negligent infliction of emotional
distress fall within several "categories"24 such as telegraph cases, 21 dead body
14. 10 La. Ann. 33 (1855).
15. Id. at 37.
16. Id. at 38.
17. Vindictive damages are "in the nature of a penalty and of an example-partaking
of the character of public justice, while redressing a private wrong." Id. The court considered
mental anguish damages to be in the nature of vindictive damages.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Kaufman v. Clark, 141 La. 316, 75 So. 65 (1917); Brinkman v. St. Landry Cotton
Oil Co., 118 La. 835, 43 So. 458 (1907); Sperier v. Ott, 116 La. 1087, 41 So. 323 (1906).
21. 556 So. 2d 559, 569 (La. 1990).
22. The third circuit referred to these cases as "maverick cases" in Lejeune v. Rayne
Branch Hosp., 539 So. 2d 849, 852-53 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989). They are Vidrine v. Gov't
Employees Ins. Co., 528 So. 2d 765 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 532 So. 2d 156 (1988);
Skorlich v. East Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 478 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985); Holland
v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 135 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961); Jordan v. Fidelity
& Casualty Co. of N.Y., 90 So. 2d 531 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956); Champagne v. Hearty,
76 So. 2d 453 (La. App. Orl. 1954); Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d
847 (La. App. Orl. 1951).
23. Cases allowing recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress not involving
injury to a third person include missent telegraph messages and damage to property. See
McGee v. Yazoo & M.V.R., 206 La. 121, 19 So. 2d 21 (1944), and Graham v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 109 La. 1069, 34 So. 91 (1903) respectively.
24. Moresi v. Department of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1096 (La. 1990).
25. Graham, 109 La. 1069, 34 So. 91.
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cases, 26 property damage cases,27 breach of contract cases,2 and fear for
personal safety cases?29
Graham v. Western Union Telegraph Co.30 involved a woman at-
tempting to recover damages for mental anguish occasioned by her inability
to contact her ill son prior to his death. She could not reach her son
before he died because the telegraph company failed to promptly deliver
a telegraph informing her of her son's condition. The Louisiana Supreme
Court allowed recovery, but did so on a breach of contract theory under
Louisiana Civil Code article 1934,11 as opposed to a tort theory under
Article 2315.
The "dead body" cases generally involved some sort of mishandling32
or mutilation33 of a corpse. Recovery for mental anguish arising under
such circumstances is generally allowed to close relatives such as the
parents,3 the children, 3 the grandchildren, 36 the surviving spouse,37 and
the brothers and sisters.3" However, these cases do not base recovery on
mental anguish as a result of injury to another. Rather the close relatives
are allowed to recover for mental anguish because they are considered
to have a quasi-property interest in the corpse which has been violated. 9
One may also recover for mental anguish arising from damage to his
property. 40 However, recovery is normally permitted in only four instances:
1) property [is] damaged by an intentional or illegal act;
2) property [is] damaged by acts for which the tortfeasor will be
strictly or absolutely liable;
26. Fortuna v. St. Bernard Memorial Gardens, Inc., 529 So. 2d 883 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1988); French v. Ochsner Clinic, 200 So. 2d 371 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); Blanchard
v. Brawley, 75 So. 2d 891 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1954).
27. McGee, 206 La. 121, 19 So. 2d 21.
28. Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 135 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
29. Klein v. Medical Bldg. Realty Co., 147 So. 2d 122 (La. App. Ori. 1933).
30. 109 La. 1069, 34 So. 91 (1903).
31. Article 1934 (now La. Civ. Code art. 1998) allowed for nonpecuniary damages for
breach of a contract which had for its object the gratification of some intellectual enjoyment.
Id. at 1073, 34 So. at 93.
32. Fortuna v. St. Bernard Memorial Gardens, Inc., 529 So. 2d 883 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1988).
33. Blanchard v. Brawley, 75 So. 2d 891 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954).
34. Id.
35. Humphreys v. Bennett Oil Corp., 195 La. 531, 197 So. 222 (1940) (defendant
disturbed the grave of plaintiff's father).
36. Kok v. Harris, 563 So. 2d 374 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990) (son of the deceased
refused to delay the funeral one hour to allow the grandchildren to arrive).
37. Burton v. City of New Orleans, 464 So. 2d 943 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985).
38. Blanchard v. Brawley, 75 So. 2d 891 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1954).
39. Id. at 893-94.
40. McGee v. Yazoo & M.V.R., 206 La. 121, 130-31, 19 So. 2d 21, 24 (1944).
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3) property [is] damaged by acts constituting a continuous nui-
sance; and,
4) property [is] damaged at a time when the owner thereof is
present or situated nearby and the owner experiences trauma as
a result.41
Recovery is not allowed for minimal and normal worry suffered by the
property owner where mere negligence caused the damage. 42
Damages for mental anguish suffered as a result of undergoing a
traumatic ordeal are also recoverable.4 3 These cases are referred to as
"fear for one's self" cases. In Chappetta v. Bowman Transportation,
Inc.,44 the plaintiff, a young female driver, was stopped at an intersection.
A tractor-trailer truck was making a left hand turn onto the road where
the plaintiff was stopped. The truck's rear tires rolled over the hood and
roof of the plaintiff's car. The plaintiff was not physically injured at all,
but she became hysterical and was treated for post-traumatic stress dis-
order. The trial court allowed her to recover $1,000 for her fear and
worry. The appellate court upheld the plaintiff's recovery and stated,
"[W]hen emotional injuries are proven by a preponderance of the evidence
to exist and to have been caused by a negligent act, damages should be
awarded for those injuries. ' 4 The court recognized the fear of frivolous
claims but held that, like physical injuries, the problem is one of proof
to be decided by the trier of fact.46 The court went on to state that
"duty/risk analysis and proximate cause concepts serve to limit liability
to those emotional injuries that were foreseeable or that could have been
reasonably anticipated to result from the negligent act. ' 41
In none of these cases was recovery based on injury to a third person.
However, there were several so called "maverick" cases0 which allowed
recovery for mental anguish as a result of injury to a third person. The
first of these cases was Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. 49 The
41. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dunn, 484 So. 2d 853, 856 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1986). See Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 227 La. 866, 80 So. 2d 845 (1955)
(absolute liability); McGee, 206 La. 121, 19 So. 2d 21 (nuisance); Meshell v. Insurance Co.
of N. Am., 416 So. 2d 1383 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982) (illegal act); Speight v. Southern
Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 254 So. 2d 485 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971) (owner of property being
nearby).
42. Farr v. Johnson, 308 So. 2d 884 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
43. Carroll v. State Farm Ins. Co., 427 So. 2d 24 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
44. 415 So. 2d 1019 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
45. Id. at 1022.
46. Id. at 1022-23.
47. Id. at 1023.
48. See supra note 22.
49. 50 So. 2d 847 (La. App. Orl. 1951); see also Jordan v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.,
90 So. 2d 531 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956) (husband awarded damages for his mental anguish
resulting from physical injury sustained by his pregnant wife in a car accident).
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Orleans Appellate Court in Valence allowed recovery of damages for
mental anguish suffered by the husband due to his worry about the
unborn fetus of his wife following injury to the wife.5 0 This case, however,
"stands alone contrary to the weight of the firmly established jurisprudence
of this state" 5 -or at least it did for several years.
The next "maverick" case was Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance
Co.52 In Holland, a couple contracted with Terminix, a pest control
company, to place rat poison in the couple's house. The couple's son
ate the rat poison, and when the couple called Terminix to find out what
type of poison was used, Terminix did not know. The first circuit court
of appeal allowed the parents to recover for their mental anguish. 3 After
recognizing the Black rule and quoting American Law Reports,54 the court
held that Terminix had a duty to know the substance of its rat poison.
This duty "arises ex contractu as well as ex delicto." ' The court recognized
the ongoing viability of the Black rule 6 and held: "[E]xcepted from said
rule, however, are those instances wherein a plaintiff suing for mental
pain and anguish occasioned by physical injury to another does so on
the basis of a breach of a primary legal duty and obligation owed by
the defendant directly to the plaintiff seeking such damages. '5 7
Over the next twenty-nine years, the appellate courts of Louisiana
struggled with the issue of negligent infliction of emotional distress where
injury to a third person was involved. Cases arose involving rape,58 battery,5 9
50. Valence, 50 So. 2d at 854.
51. Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 135 So. 2d 145, 154 (La. App. Ist Cir.
1961).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. The court relied on J.E. Macy, Annotation, Damages, 18 A.L.R. 2d, § 7, 239-40
(1951), and quoted the entire Section 7 Editorial Comment, the most pertinent part being:
"Before a defendant can be held liable to a plaintiff for the probable consequences of an
act, it must appear that the act was a breach of duty to the plaintiff, not merely to someone
else." Holland, 135 So. 2d at 152 (court's emphasis).
55. Holland, 135 So. 2d at 158.
56. 88 See supra text accompanying note 19.
57. Holland, 135 So. 2d at 158-59.
58.. In Brauninger v. Ducote, 381 So. 2d 1246 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), the court
denied 'a mother's claim for mental anguish suffered as a result of the defendant's 17-year-
old son raping her minor daughter. The court questioned the logic of Louisiana jurisprudence
but adhered to it; see also then Judge Lemmon's concurrence. However, in Bishop v. Callais,
533 So. 2d 121 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988), the court stated that the plaintiffs, who suffered
mental anguish when their son was raped by an employee of the psychiatric hospital he
was in; may have a cause of action if they could show the hospital breached a duty owed
directly to them.
59. In Fisher v. Louisiana Dep't of Pub. Safety, 555 So. 2d 626 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1989), recovery was denied to a brother and brother-in-law who witnessed the direct victim's
beating. In Hardin v. Munchies Food Store, 521 So. 2d 1200 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988), the
court awarded a girl damages for her mental anguish due to fear for her own safety but
denied any recovery for mental anguish caused by watching her boyfriend get beaten.
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trespass,60 kidnapping,6' medical malpractice,6 fear for one's own safety or
trauma of an ordeal,6 3 and instances where the plaintiff was not present
at the scene of the accident."
These cases clearly indicate that Louisiana law allows one to recover
for mental anguish without accompanying physical injury.65 However,
when a person was neither physically injured nor physically involved in
the accident, the trend of these cases reveals that one who merely witnessed
injury to another or suffered grief because of injury to a loved one could
not recover due to the vitality of the Black rule. On the other hand,
when a duty was owed directly to the plaintiff claiming mental anguish,
the courts allowed recovery when there was a breach of that duty causing
genuine mental anguish.
This was the state of the law when Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital%
reached the Louisiana Supreme Court. In Lejeune, the court plainly
granted recovery for mental anguish arising from injury to another. The
plaintiff was the wife of a comatose patient being treated at the defendant
hospital. Her husband was bitten on the face several times by rats. The
wife came upon the scene shortly thereafter (but after the wounds had
been cleaned) and claimed she "suffered mental anguish, due to her seeing
her husband having been eaten alive by a rodent." 67
60. Ard v. Samedan Oil Corp., 475 So. 2d 384 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
61. In Spencer v. Terebelo, 373 So. 2d 200 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), the court allowed
recovery for mental anguish to a father as a result of the mother kidnapping their children.
The court based its holding on a breach of a legal duty owed to the custodial parent by
the non-custodial parent.
62. In Blackwell v. Oser, 436 So. 2d 1293 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983), the court denied
recovery for mental anguish to the father of a child born deformed as a result of the
defendant-doctor's negligence. The mother was allowed to recover, however, because, ac-
cording to the court, the doctor owed a duty to the mother (who was the patient) but not
to her husband. The court criticized Louisiana jurisprudence but abided by it. In Skorlich
v. East Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 478 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985), an almost identical
set of facts occurred. This court disregarded Blackwell, finding a duty was owed to. the
husband by his wife's physician and thus allowing recovery for his mental anguish.
63. Mayo v. Borden, Inc., 784 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1986); Courmier v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 486 So. 2d 243 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986); Carroll v. State Farm Ins. Co., 427 So. 2d
24 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983); Chappetta v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 415 So. 2d 1019 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1982); Butler v. Pardue, 415 So. 2d 249 (La App. 2d Cir. 1982); Hoffman
v. All Star Ins. Corp., 288 So. 2d 388 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Klein v. Medical Bldg.
Realty Co., 147 So. 122 (La. App. Orl. 1933); Laird v. Natchitoches Oil Mill, Inc., 120
So. 692 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1929).
64. Gibbons v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 391 So. 2d 976 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980);
Lanham v. Woodward, Wight & Co., Ltd., 386 So. 2d 131 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980);
Bourque v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 345 So. 2d 237 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977); Hickman
v. Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 314 So. 2d 486 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
65. Moresi v. Department of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1990); Stewart
v. Arkansas S. R.R., 112 La. 764, 36 So. 676 (1904).
66. 556 So. 2d 559 (La. 1990).
67. Id. at 561.
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The court went through a long discussion of Black and many cases
following it. The court dismissed the impact rule and the zone of danger
test. 69 After a discussion of other jurisdictions' treatment of bystander
recovery,70 the court performed a duty-risk analysis. The court stated that
if the hospital was negligent in allowing the rats to bite Mr. Lejeune, 71
then this was the cause-in-fact of Mrs. Lejeune's injuries. The court then
said that if the hospital had a duty not to cause Mrs. Lejeune emotional
distress, it breached that duty. 72 The supreme court then stated that there
was no reason to bar recovery of damages for all claims of mental anguish
and overruled Black, holding that "[a] duty does exist to protect a plaintiff
from mental anguish damages occasioned by the negligent infliction of
injury to a third person."' 73 The court did, however, impose restrictions
on bystander recovery.7 4
Following the overruling of 135 years of jurisprudence in Lejeune,
the next case in this saga was Clomon v. Monroe City School Board.7 5
There, the supreme court granted recovery but on a different basis than
in Lejeune. In Clomon, a school bus carrying handicapped children stopped
to drop off a four year old passenger. The attendant on the bus did not
escort the child across the street as was her job, but instead merely
escorted the child to the center line next to the bus. In addition, the bus
driver turned his warning lights off and started to accelerate while the
child was at the center line. The plaintiff, Sonya Clomon, turned onto
the street, approaching the bus from the opposite direction at a lawful
speed, and did not see the boy. As she passed the front of the bus, the
boy darted out from the center line and was struck by Sonya Clomon's
car. The boy later died. Sonya Clomon was arrested, booked, and charged
with negligent homicide, though the charges were later reduced to negligent
operation of a motor vehicle.76
The court discussed the bystander recovery rule as handed down in
Lejeune but came to the conclusion that it did not apply to this situation.
68. Id. at 564. The impact rule limits recovery for mental anguish for harm to another
to those who were physically impacted.
69. Id. The zone of danger test limits recovery for mental anguish to those who were
sufficiently close to the danger.
70. The court discussed Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968), the seminal case in
this country allowing recovery for mental anguish of a bystander who was neither physically
impacted nor within the zone of danger, as well as several subsequent cases. Id.
71. Because the case was before the court under an exception of no cause of action,
the court accepted as true Mrs. Lejeune's allegations that the hospital was negligent. Id. at
566 (citing La. Code of Civ. P. art. 931).
72. Id. at 567.
73. Id. at 569.
74. See supra note 4.
75. 572 So. 2d 571 (La. 1990).
76. Id. at 572-73.
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The court explained that "the Lejeune court did not intend to modify
or interrupt the development of rules or decisions permitting recovery for
emotional distress from a tortfeasor who owed the plaintiff a special,
direct duty created by law, contract or special relationship. '77 The court
found that the bus driver's failure to adhere to Louisiana Revised Statutes
32:80,78 which requires a bus driver to activate the warning signals when
receiving or discharging pupils, was a breach of a delictual duty owed
specially and directly to Sonya as a motorist. The court stated: "Con-
sequently we conclude that in the narrow class of cases involving the
direct, special statutory duty owed to the motorist, there is no justification
for the creation of juristic limitations upon the principle of reparation
underlying Civil Code Article 2315." 79 In addition, the court held that
any contributory negligence on the part of Sonya Clomon did not bar
her recovery but merely reduced it by the percentage of her fault.8 0
The final case in this line of jurisprudence is Guillory v. Arceneaux,1
an appellate court case. This case was an appeal from an exception of
no cause of action. Ms. Guillory, a motorist, entered a bypass which
was icy and unlit. Prior to Ms. Guillory's arrival on the bypass, Ms.
Arceneaux's car had struck a guardrail, and Ms. Arceneaux had left her
car and had been struck by an eighteen-wheeler. She was lying injured
in the road when Ms. Guillory drove around the curve of the bypass.
Ms. Guillory attempted to stop but could not, and she struck Arceneaux
who was killed.8 2 Ms. Guillory brought an action to recover for her own
mental anguish suffered as a result of this incident.8 3
The court removed this situation from the realm of the bystander
recovery rule of Lejeune because Ms. Guillory was a participant in the
accident and not a bystander.84 The court also distinguished this case
from Clomon, saying there was no special, direct statutory duty that Ms.
77. Id. at 575.
78. La. R.S. 32:80 (1963 & Supp. 1992).
79. Clomon, 572 So. 2d at 578.
80. Id. at 578-79; La. Civ. Code art. 2323.
81. 580 So. 2d 990 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991); compare with Devereux v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 557 So. 2d 1091 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990) (a similar case decided differently, but before
Clomon was handed down by the Supreme Court).
82. This was an appeal from an overruling of an exception of no cause of action,
thus the court accepted the plaintiff's allegations as true. The plaintiff's allegations imply
that Arceneaux may have died as a result of being struck by Guillory's vehicle. Guillory,
580 So. 2d at 991-92.
83. Id. at 992. The parties to this suit were Arceneaux's liability insurer (her estate
was not a defendant), the owner and the driver of the eighteen-wheeler and their liability
insurer, Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n (LIGA), and the Louisiana Department of Transportation
and Development.
84. Id.
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Arceneaux owed to Ms. Guillory as a motorist."5 The court affirmed the
trial court's overruling of the exception of no cause of action, reasoning
that Ms. Guillory was physically involved in the accident and suffered
emotional injury as a result, which has long been compensable even with
no accompanying physical injury. 6
This was the state of the Louisiana jurisprudence when Louisiana
Civil Code article 2315.6 was enacted."' Article 2315.6 is nearly identical
to the restrictions listed in Lejeune, except it lists the close relationships
needed to recover, whereas Lejeune left open "for another day" exactly
who met the restriction."' The question then becomes whether Article
2315.6 is 1) a legislative approval of Lejeune and an overruling of Clomon
and Guillory or 2) merely a legislative approval of Lejeune that fills
Lejeune's "close relationship" gap and leaves Clomon and Guillory intact.
In addition, the question arises as to what affect an acceptance of Justice
Hall's analysis in Clomon 9 would have on the application of Article
2315.6. The next section of this comment will attempt to answer these
questions.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Comparison of Bystander Recovery and Traditional Recovery
As stated earlier, there seem to be two categories of cases dealing
with negligent infliction of emotional distress: 1) the traditional case
where the defendant's negligence is aimed directly at the plaintiff and 2)
the bystander recovery case where the defendant's negligence is aimed at
a third person and the plaintiff suffers emotional distress from having
viewed the injury, as in Lejeune. Do Clomon and Guillory (and the
introductory hypo) fall within the former or the latter category and is
Article 2315.6 applicable to these situations?
The Clomon and Guillory scenario should be analyzed under the same
rules that were developing for "traditional" negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress as these cases are, in reality, traditional cases and not
bystander situations. The court in Clomon recognized this when it stated,
"[Tihe Lejeune court did not intend to modify or interrupt the devel-
opment of rules or decisions permitting recovery for emotional distress
85. Id. at 998. However, this case was granted supervisory writs to the court of appeal
before Clomon and then was decided after Clomon. Plaintiff cited two statutes which may
form a special, direct, statutory duty, but the court felt there was a duty owed regardless.
86. Id. at 993-98.
87. For the text of Article 2315.6, see supra text accompanying note 13.
88. Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d, 559, 570 (La. 1990); see supra note
4 for the Lejeune restrictions.
89. Clomon v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 572 So. 2d 571, 579 (La. 1990) (Hall, J.,
concurring). See supra text accompanying note 9.
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from a tortfeasor who owed the plaintiff a special, direct duty created
by law, contract or special relationship.' 90 The court discussed several
cases that recognized such an "independent duty owed to an aggrieved
non-traumatically injured plaintiff." 9' In fact, the Black decision itself
says, "We carefully note the distinction between the immediate sufferer
from a railroad accident, and a relative of the sufferer." 9 The Black
court went on to state: "[W]e deem it advisable not to extend the right
to recover . . [mental anguish] damages, to others than those who, in
their own proper persons, are victims of the misconduct," 93 thus implicitly
indicating that "those who, in their own proper persons, are victims of
misconduct" may recover.
In Clomon, the defendant conceded that the plaintiff met three of
the Lejeune requirements, but the fourth, requiring a close relationship,
was not met. If the Lejeune requirements were meant to apply to this
situation, then it would bar recovery since the close relationship require-
ment was not met. However, it would also have to apply to any situation
where injury to another occurred, including Bishop, Skorlich, Holland,
Valence, and so on.9 These cases found independent duties owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff that were breached. However, all four require-
ments of Lejeune would not have been met in any of these cases. If
those past cases were to arise today, a court would not be justified in
applying the Lejeune requirements because the Lejeune court itself ap-
proved of those earlier cases as having been based on a different rationale
than bystander recovery. 95
To further support this distinction, there appears to be no real dif-
ference between the situation in Chappetta9 and the situation in Clomon 97
90. Id. at 575 (emphasis added).
91. id. (quoting Lejeune, 556 So. 2d 559, 567). The court briefly discussed Bishop v.
Callais, 533 So. 2d 121 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988); Skorlich v. East Jefferson Gen. Hosp.,
478 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985); Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 135 So.
2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961); Jordan v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 90 So. 2d 531 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1956); Champagne v. Hearty, 76 So. 2d 453 (La. App. Orl. 1955); and Valence
v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. App. Orl. 1951). Id. at 575-76.
92. Black v. Carrollton R.R., 10 La. Ann. 33, 38 (1855).
93. Id.
94. See supra notes 22 and 58.
95. Clomon v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 572 So. 2d 571, 584 (La. 1990) (Dennis, J.,
assigning additional reasons in support of the majority opinion) (citing Lejeune, 556 So. 2d
559). Justice Dennis' additional reasons provide an excellent discussion of the difference
between bystander recovery and other types of recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
distress such as in Clomon. He explains why Lejeune does not apply to a Clomon type
situation.
96. Chappetta v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 415 So. 2d 1019 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982);
see supra text accompanying notes 44-47.
97. Clomon, 572 So. 2d 571; see supra text accompanying notes 75-80.
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or Guillory.98 In Chappetta, the defendant's tractor-trailer wheels rolled
over the plaintiff's car causing the plaintiff emotional distress. Is there
any difference between the defendant negligently rolling his tires over the
plaintiff's car in Chappetta and the defendant's negligently hitting the
plaintiff's car with a child in Clomon? Essentially, in Clomon, the de-
fendant's negligence caused Sonya Clomon's car to be hit with a person,
causing mental anguish to the plaintiff, and, in Chappetta, the defendant's
negligence caused the plaintiff's car to be hit with tires causing mental
anguish to the plaintiff. This is in no way meant to imply that the plaintiff
in Clomon suffered a worse injury than the little boy, but rather to
illustrate the method by which the defendant's negligence caused the
plaintiff's harm. Similarly, as the defendant in Chappetta negligently rolled
his tires over the plaintiff's car, the defendant in Guillory negligently
caused a person to be rolled underneath the plaintiff's car causing the
plaintiff severe emotional distress.
It should not be debated that a person owes a duty not to hit someone
negligently with a thing. This duty should apply whether the defendant
hits the plaintiff with a thing such as a car or with the body of a person.
This is different and distinct from bystander recovery and should be
treated differently and distinctly. In a bystander recovery situation, the
defendant hits a person causing severe injury or death, but that person
is not the plaintiff; the plaintiff is a bystander nearby. There is no
independent duty owed by the defendant to the bystander, but rather that
duty must be "borrowed" from the breach of the defendant's duty owed
to the direct victim.
In further support of this distinction between bystander recovery and
recovery in a Clomon and Guillory situation, an analysis of Justice
Watson's and Justice Hall's concurrences in Clomon is in order. Justice
Watson acknowledged in his Clomon concurrence that he had dissented
in Lejeune, but stated: "Here the plaintiff [Sonya Clomon] was not a
bystander; she was physically involved in the accident. For this reason,
I would hold that she is entitled to recover for her emotional damages."9'
Justice Hall's concurrence not only recognizes this distinction but also
recognizes a distinction in the actual cause of the emotional distress:
Here, plaintiff [Sonya Clomon] was not a bystander. As a result
of the defendant's breach of duty owed to her, she became a
participant in the accident. Plaintiff does not seek to recover as
a result of witnessing an injury to another; she seeks to recover
because she was involved in a traumatic accident as a result of
the defendant's negligence. Her emotional distress suffered during
98. Guillory v. Arceneaux, 580 So. 2d 990 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991); see supra text
accompanying notes 81-86.
99. Clomon, 572 So. 2d at 579 (Watson, J., concurring).
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an accident in which she was involved and which was caused by
defendant's negligence is compensable. Since she was a participant
in the accident she is entitled to recover because of her concern
for her own well-being, not merely because of her concern for
a third party as a witness to the accident. While she probably
suffered no fear for her physical well-being, she likely suffered
great fear of the consequences of having hit a child and severe
guilt and remorse. This emotional distress, conceded by all to be
serious and disabling, was caused by the negligence of the de-
fendant, and therefore plaintiff is entitled to recover for it.100
Civil Code article 2315.6 states, "Damages suffered as a result of mental
anguish or emotional distress for injury to another shall be recovered
only in accordance with this Article." According to Justice Hall, though,
Sonya Clomon did not suffer mental anguish because of injury to another
but because she was "involved in a traumatic accident as a result of the
defendant's negligence."' 0 1 Justice Hall's concurrence was cited in its
entirety in Guillory with approval.'0 2
Based on language used by the court in Lejeune and Clomon and
on a comparison of the situations, it seems that bystander recovery is
separate and distinct from a Clomon or Guillory type of situation. The
Clomon and Guillory type of situation should (as should the introductory
hypo) be analyzed under traditional theories that were developing before
Lejeune. Alternatively, under Justice Hall's analysis, since the mental
anguish is not for "injury to another," Article 2315.6 would be inap-
plicable for this reason alone.
B. Wording of Article 2315.6
The Louisiana Legislature in enacting Article 2315.6 seems to have
adopted the Lejeune requirements virtually verbatim and simply added a
concrete list of the close relationships required to recover. 0 3 The article
allows recovery by certain persons "who view an event ... or who come
upon the scene of the event soon thereafter." That language is virtually
identical to the first requirement of Lejeune,10 and seems to be the very
essence of bystander recovery. Thus, if you are a bystander (i.e., you
view the event or come upon the scene soon thereafter), you must then
meet all the requirements set forth in Article 2315.6 in order to recover.
While it is true that one who is a participant in an accident, such as
100. Id. (emphasis added) (Hall, J., concurring).
101. Id. (Hall, J., concurring).
102. Guillory, 580 So. 2d at 994-95.
103. See supra text accompanying note 13 and supra note 4.
104. See supra note 4.
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our motorist in the hypo, generally views the accident, it seems the
legislature used words, as stated above, normally associated with bystander
recovery. For Clomon to be brought under Article 2315.6, without also
including the rest of the jurisprudence relating to recovery for emotional
distress, words such as "or is physically involved in the event causing
injury to another person" should have been added to the first sentence.
The last sentence of Article 2315.6 states, "Damages suffered as a
result of mental anguish or emotional distress for injury to another shall
be recovered only in accordance with this Article." This sentence does
not, however, bring all claims for emotional distress within the purview
of this article. This sentence does, since the article deals with bystander
recovery, bring all bystander recovery within the scope of the article. The
reason for this sentence is because of certain language in Clomon. In
Clomon, there was a violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:80, which
basically requires a school bus driver to turn on his warning lights when
letting children off the bus.' °5 The court found that the purpose of the
statute included the protection of motorists from emotional distress which
they may suffer should they hit a child because of the bus driver's violation
of the statute.106 From this language, one could logically infer that the
court could find in other statutes a direct duty to protect bystanders from
emotional distress arising from witnessing injury to another. To prevent
this, the last sentence of Article 2315.6 was added."" Thus, bystander
recovery is completely and inextricably self-contained within Article 2315.6,
and the courts may not wander to other statutes to find a direct duty
to allow recovery to bystanders who do not fit the requirements of Article
2315.6. This does not change the fact, however, that Article 2315.6 applies
to bystander recovery only and not to recovery for emotional distress
brought about in other ways.
C. Policy Considerations
The policy concerns behind the limitations set forth in Lejeune and
Article 2315.6 do not exist in situations like those in Clomon and Guillory.
There are several reasons why the courts and the legislature may want
to limit the class of claimants who may recover for negligent infliction
of emotional distress. First, allowing recovery may subject the defendant
105. Clomon, 572 So. 2d at 577.
106. Id. at 578.
107. See Louisiana State Senate Committee on Judiciary, Section A, Minutes of Meeting
of May 21, 1991. Senator Bankston explains that this last sentence is the only significant
change from SB 344 which was proposed in the 1990 regular session and this current bill,
SB 547, which was adopted as Article 2315.6. Thus it appears that the legislature was fearful
of the statutory interpretation used in Clomon and fearful that it might be used to alter
the intent of Article 2315.6; therefore the legislature added the last sentence.
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to a myriad of claims. 08 Second, allowing recovery in certain situations
may open the "floodgates of litigation." 09 Finally, allowing recovery may
result in many fraudulent and trivial claims being presented to the courts." 0
A defendant who negligently caused some event to occur would be
subject to a myriad of claims if anyone disturbed by the event could
recover from him; that would surely be unreasonable."' Thus, the by-
stander recovery rule embodied in Article 2315.6 limits the bystanders
who may recover to close family members who view the accident or come
upon the accident scene soon thereafter." 2 However, preventing the de-
fendant from being subjected to a myriad of claims is no reason to.
prevent a Clomon or Guillory type of plaintiff from recovering. In these
situations, the defendant is subject to claims by only those people who
are directly involved in the accident and to whom he breached a direct
duty, just as if the claimants had been physically injured. There is no
fear of the defendant being subjected to dozens of claims simply because
there were many witnesses-a common concern in a bystander situation.
The class of claimants is limited to the number of people directly involved
in the injury causing event to whom the defendant breached a direct
duty. Thus, the policy consideration of limiting the claims against a
defendant is not a legitimate concern in a Clomon or Guillory situation.
The fear of opening the courts to a flood of litigation is another
argument against allowing recovery for mental anguish for injury to
another. It is somewhat a combination of the other two fears-a myriad
of claims, and fraudulent and trivial claims. However, the job of the
courts is to resolve disputes between parties. When parties have genuine
claims that should be redressed, they should not be denied access to the
courts merely because there may be many others with similar claims. In
reality, would there be that many new lawsuits filed, or would there
simply be a new issue to litigate in the lawsuits where previously only
the physical injuries and its associated mental anguish had to be litigated?
The fear of opening a "Pandora's Box of litigation" is a "cry [that]
has been raised against every innovation in tort litigation .... To refuse
to entertain valid claims because others might be fraudulently brought is
an argument of expediency rather than of justice.""' Expediency also
108. Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 135 So. 2d 145, 155 (La. App. Ist Cir.
1961) (citing J.E. Macy, Annotation, Damages, 18 A.L.R. 2d, § 7, 239-40 (1951)); see also
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 54, at 361 (5th ed.
1984).
109. Holland, 135 So. 2d at 155. See also Keeton et al., supra note 108, § 12, at 56.
110. Brauninger v. Ducote, 381 So. 2d 1246, 1249 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979) (Lemmon,
J., concurring). See also Keeton et al., supra note 108, § 54, at 361.
ill. Keeton et al., supra note 108, § 54, at 366.
112. See supra text accompanying note 13.
113. Ferdinand F. Stone, Tort Doctrine § 170, at 220 in 12 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1977).
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should not be used to bar genuine claims that should be redressed simply
because there may be many of them. Thus, the fear of a flood of new
litigation is not a satisfactory excuse for denying claims of a whole class
of plaintiffs such as our motorist.
The fear of fraudulent and trivial claims is of equal concern in both
bystander recovery and traditional (Clomon and Guillory included) situa-
tions. However, this can be handled by "careful scrutiny of the evidence
supporting the claim; and the elimination of trivialities calls for nothing
more than the same common sense which has distinguished serious from
trifling injuries in other fields of the law,""14 such as with physical injury.
The legislature has chosen to handle this policy concern for bystander
recovery, as did the court in Lejeune, by requiring that the direct victim
suffer such harm as to make it reasonable for the claimant to suffer
serious emotional distress, and that the claimant's emotional distress be
severe, debilitating, and foreseeable.'" There is no reason why these same
principles cannot be applied to ensure that a claimant directly involved
in the accident and to whom the defendant breached a direct duty, such
as our motorist, suffered genuine and serious emotional distress.
Since the policy goals of limiting the number of claimants and closing
the floodgates of litigation, which are addressed by Article 2315.6, are
not required in a Clomon or Guillory type of situation where traditional
theories can be applied, the tighter restrictions of Louisiana Civil Code
article 2315.6 should not apply to those situations.
D. A Continuum of Recovery
Imagine a continuum of mental anguish damages with the measuring
sticks being ease of association and breach of duty. On the left of the
continuum, recovery is allowed only for intentional infliction of emotional
distress accompanied by physical harm which is aimed directly and only
at the claimant. On the right, recovery is allowed for negligent infliction
of emotional distress allowed to everyone who hears of a particular
event." 6 Recovery under Clomon seems to have a greater ease of asso-
ciation and a more direct breach of duty than Lejeune and, thus, belongs
to the left of Lejeune on this continuum.
114. Keeton et al., supra note 108, § 12, at 56.
115. Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559, 570 (La. 1990); La. Civ. Code
art. 2315.6.
116. The classic hypo: Can everyone who heard of John F. Kennedy being shot recover
for their emotional distress? An affirmative answer places this at the right of the continuum.
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Intentional
infliction of Everyone
emotional distress who hears of
aimed directly Clomon & Lejeune event can
at claimant Chappetta Guillory & 2315.6 recover
In further support of this proposition, note that Justice Watson, while
dissenting in Lejeune,l 7 concurred in the result in Clomon, stating that
"awarding damages to a person actually involved in an accident, no
matter what the nature of the damages, is a much more precise and
concrete application of Civil Code article 2315 than formulating and
applying the necessarily arbitrary guidelines necessitated by the allowance
of 'bystander recovery.""'1 8
Therefore, if Civil Code article 2315.6 is read to overrule Clomon
and Guillory, the result would be: 1) a class of claimants on the left of
this continuum could recover IChappettal; 2) a class in the middle [Clomon
and Guillory type claimants] could not recover; and 3) a class of claimants
in the more liberal theory of bystander recovery, as in Lejeune, on the
right of the continuum could also recover. Such, a result would be
unreasonable. Therefore, the logical interpretation of Article 2315.6 is
that it is merely a legislative approval of Lejeune, and Clomon and
Guillory should not be overruled.
117. Lejeune, 556 So. 2d at 571 (Watson, J., dissenting).
118. Clomon v. Mo'nroe City Sch. Bd., 572 So. 2d 571, 579 (La. 1990) (Watson, J.,
concurring). It is interesting to note that Judge Stoker, the author of the Guillory opinio n,
was also the author of Lejeune at the appellate court level. Judge Stoker, in Lejeune v.
Rayne Branch Hosp., 539 So. 2d 849 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989), cqf'd, 556 So. 2d 559 (1990),
allowed recovery to Mrs. Lejeune for her mental anguish suffered as a result of injury to
her husband. He based his decision on Articles 2315 and 2315.2, limiting the class of
claimants to the same categories of persons as would have a cause of action for wrongful
death. Thus, while advocating a "close relative" restriction for bystander recovery, Judge
Stoker endorses Mrs. Guillory's cause of action despite the fact that she was not related
to Mrs. Arceneaux and that there was no direct, special statutory duty as required by
Clomon.
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E. Conclusion of Application of Article 2315,6
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 provides: "Every act whatever of
man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened
to repair it." Louisiana Civil Code article 2316 reads: "Every person is
responsible for the damage he occasions not merely by his act, but by
his negligence, his imprudence, or his want of skill." These articles are
the "fountainhead of responsibility" ' 9 in Louisiana tort law. They are
the basis for recovery of any damages, including emotional distress, caused
by the negligence of another. 20
Any limitation on recovery, or limitation as to who may recover,
under Article 2315 should be read strictly so as to apply such limitations
in no more limiting a way than that clearly intended by the legislature.
Civil Code article 2315.6 certainly seems to be a legislative limitation of
Articles 2315 and 2316, so it should be read in no more of a limiting
fashion than that clearly intended by the legislature. As shown earlier,'2 '
it appears the legislature intended this article to be a bystander recovery
statute, or at least it is unclear whether it intended the article to cover
any other areas. Therefore, Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.6 must be
interpreted to apply only to bystander recovery and to confine bystander
recovery within the parameters of Article 2315.6.
IV. EFFECTS
A. Bystander Recovery
In a bystander recovery situation under Article 2315.6, prior juris-
prudence interpreting Lejeune will be controlling because the law has not
changed other than by specifying which relatives may recover. This com-
ment will now analyze the four requirements of Lejeune and Article
2315.6 which are: 1) that the claimant view the event or come upon the
scene of the event soon thereafter; 2) that the claimant have a specified
close relationship with the injured person; 3) that the injured person's
harm be such that the claimant could have reasonably suffered serious
mental anguish; and 4) that the emotional distress be severe, debilitating,
and foreseeable."2
1. The Claimant Must View the Event
There are no cases interpreting Lejeune which deny recovery based
on a failure to view the event or come upon the scene soon thereafter.
However, in Bernard v. State Department of Transportation & Devel-
119. Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 1077, 249 So. 2d 133, 137 (1971).
120. Stewart v. Arkansas S. R.R., 112 La. 764, 36 So. 676 (1904).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 90-107:
122. See supra text accompanying note 13 and see supra note 4.
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opment,123 the court stated in dicta that the plaintiff did not meet the
first (viewing) requirement of Lejeune. The plaintiff was informed of his
son's auto accident two hours after it occurred. He then went to the
hospital, where his son's condition had substantially changed. He did not
go to the scene of the accident until 7:30 the next morning.' The reasoning
of the court in saying the viewing requirement was not met seems to be
correct.
In Matthews v. Turner,' the plaintiff was awarded $50,000 for her
mental anguish suffered as a result of witnessing her daughter suffer over
a forty-eight hour period and then die due to a physician's misdiagnosis.2 6
The court relied on Lejeune but did not discuss whether or how the
plaintiff met the four criteria.'2 This is unfortunate. It seems debatable
whether the plaintiff actually viewed the event which caused the injury
(the misdiagnosis of appendicitis). It could be said that the mother came
upon the scene of the event soon thereafter, as she cared for her daughter
immediately thereafter and over the next forty-eight hours prior to her
death, but some discussion is clearly warranted before a court grants
recovery in such a case. 2 This writer believes that recovery is warranted
and will generally be granted in this situation, but the application of
Article 2315.6 to a medical malpractice situation certainly would make
for an interesting discussion.
In Sam v. Rogers,129 the plaintiff, husband of a pregnant woman
involved in a car accident, was awarded damages for his mental anguish
suffered as a result of his worrying about ttfe unborn fetus. This court
also relied on Lejeune with no discussion and allowed the husband to
recover despite the fact that he did not know of the event until he was
told of it upon arriving home from work that evening.'" This decision
clearly seems to be unjustified under Lejeune as well as under Article
2315.6. 1
The restriction requiring that a "bystander" view the event or come
123. 563 So. 2d 282, 286 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).
124. Id. at 286-87.
125. 566 So. 2d 133 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990).
126. Id. at 134.
127. Id. at 135.
128. See Price v. Louisiana Dept. of Transp. and Dev., 1992 WL 135054 (La. App.
4th Cir.) where the plaintiff came upon the scene soon after the injury causing event. After
brief discussion on this issue, the court allowed recovery.
129. 559 So. 2d 1001 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990).
130. Id. at 1004.
131. However, the court further justifies its decision based on. Valence v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. App. Orl. 1951), stating that not only the mother
but also the father should be awarded damages for mental anguish over worry for an
unborn fetus.
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upon the scene soon thereafter precludes one who merely learns of the
event from recovering for mental anguish.3 2 Thus, the court in Sam v.
Rogers erroneously applied Lejeune, while the court in Bernard correctly
interpreted Lejeune's "viewing" requirement.
2. Close Relationship Requirement
As to the close relationship requirement, there have been no cases
under Lejeune which have ventured outside the class of claimants listed
in Article 2315.6. Louisiana courts have held that grandchildren do fulfill
the close relationship requirement,' while close friends, no matter how
close, do not.'34 Thus it appears that the appellate courts have answered
the question left "for another day"' 3 5 in a fashion similar to the one
chosen by the legislature.
3. Claimant's Mental Anguish Must be Reasonable
There have been two cases following Lejeune that deal with the
requirement that the injured person suffer such a degree of harm that it
is reasonable that the claimant suffer mental anguish. In Frisard v.
Eastover Bank for Savings,3 6 the court disallowed plaintiff's claim for
emotional distress suffered as a result of the emotional distress suffered
by his tenants. The court differentiated Lejeune, stating that Lejeune dealt
with physical injuries of the third person and not emotional injuries."'
However, this is not a valid distinction under Lejeune, nor would it now
be a valid distinction under Article 2315.6. Clearly, the severity of the
injury to the direct victim must be such that a bystander could reasonably
be expected to suffer mental anguish for having viewed it. Therefore, it
is the severity and not the type of harm that is controlling. Nevertheless,
recovery will undoubtedly be denied in most cases where a bystander
claims emotional distress based on emotional distress suffered by the direct
victim.
Similarly, the fact that a close relative [father] suffered the possibility
of injury does not give the son a cause of action to recover damages
for his own mental anguish. In Lotz v. Ochsner Foundation Hospital,'38
an elderly patient wandered out of the hospital and into a busy thor-
132. Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559, 570 n.11 (La. 1990).
133. Thomas v. Schwegmann Giant Supermarket, 561 So. 2d 992 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1990).
135. Keen v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 583 So. 2d 835 (La. App. 1st tir. 1991).
135. Lejeune, 556 So. 2d at 570.
136. 572 So. 2d 343 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990).
137. Id. at 346.
138. 570 So. 2d 232 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990).
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oughfare. His son, who had just arrived at the hospital, saw his father
in the thoroughfare. His father, though obviously in a perilous situation,
was not injured whatsoever. The court, while recognizing that the plaintiff
met three of the Lejeune requirements, specifically denied recovery because
before recovery is allowed by the bystander, serious harm must come to
the direct victim. 3 9
These two cases seem to be in accord with Article 2315.6. Where
the line will be drawn as to the degree of severity of the direct victim's
injury is uncertain, but one thing is certain: the level of severity must
be greater than that in Frisard and Lotz.
4. Severe, Debilitating, and Foreseeable Mental Anguish
The fourth Lejeune requirement is concerned with the severity of the
plaintiff's emotional distress rather than the direct victim's injury. One
case interpreting Lejeune that denied recovery because the emotional dis-
tress of the claimant was not serious enough is Thomas v. Schweggmann
Giant Supermarket, Inc..' 40 There, the court denied recovery to small
children who witnessed their grandmother being falsely detained for shop-
lifting. Three of the Lejeune requirements were met, but the children
sought no medical attention whatsoever for their alleged emotional distress.
Indeed, the only evidence of any distress on the children's part was that
after the event, they began going into their parents' bedroom to sleep at
night.' 4' The court held that the emotional distress of the claimant children
was not serious enough and denied recovery.
The court in Lejeune gave a nonexhaustive list of examples of severe
and debilitating emotional distress: neuroses, psychoses, chronic depres-
sion, phobia, and shock.'42 It would seem any one of these or similar
categories of emotional distress would qualify under Article 2315.6.143
B. Traditional Recovery
When a person, such as our motorist, suffers mental anguish in a
Clomon or Guillory type of situation, there are three possible directions
the courts may take. The courts may find that:
1) Article 2315.6 completely bars recovery to all except the enu-
139. Id. at 233.
140. 561 So. 2d 992 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990). See also Blair v. Tynes, 1992 WL 358374
(La. App. 1st Cir.). Other cases generally accept as true that plaintiff suffered serious
emotional harm in determining whether plaintiff had a cause of action.
141. Id. at 997.
142. Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559, 570 (La. 1990).
143. See Price v. Louisiana Dept. of Trans. and Dev., 1992 WL 135054 (La. App. 4th
Cir.) for a discussion of this requirement where the court allowed recovery.
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merated close relatives;
2) Article 2315.6 is inapplicable because participant recovery is
simply a traditional type of negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress which Article 2315.6 was not meant to address; or
3) Article 2315.6 is inapplicable if one accepts Justice Hall's
theory. '44
If the first direction is taken, then this comment is moot, other than to
show that such a direction is illogical. If the second direction is taken,
traditional theories of recovery will apply. Thus, an independent, direct
duty must have been owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, that duty
must have been breached, and the mental anguish suffered must be
genuine, reasonable, and foreseeable.
The second and third directions lead to essentially the same result.
However, Justice Hall goes one step further than saying that a Clomon
and Guillory type of situation is just a traditional case. He states that
the mental anguish is not suffered "for injury to another" but rather is
suffered due to the claimant having undergone a traumatic ordeal. While
the reasoning may be slightly different, the effect is the same. Article
2315.6 would not apply; rather, the traditional theories of recovery for
emotional distress would apply.
V. CONCLUSION
Mental anguish without accompanying physical harm has always been
compensable, particularly when one undergoes a traumatic ordeal. Thus,
the basis for our motorist, and anyone else in a similar situation, to
recover has always existed in Louisiana jurisprudence. To read Article
2315.6 as allowing bystander recovery but overruling Clomon and Guillory
would be an erroneous interpretation of the article. Article 2315.6 is
basically a legislative approval of Lejeune and applies only to bystander
recovery. It sets forth specific relationships between the direct victim and
the bystander that are required before bystander recovery is allowed. In
addition, the article requires that the bystander view the event or come
upon the scene soon thereafter, that the direct victim suffer such harm
that it is reasonable for the bystander to suffer serious mental anguish,
and that the bystander's mental anguish be severe, debilitating, and fore-
seeable. Recent jurisprudence interpreting Lejeune should still be com-
pletely valid.
However, in a .Clomon or Guillory type of situation where the de-
fendant's negligence causes the plaintiff to be involved in the injuring of
144. Justice Hall's theory is that the claimant does not suffer mental anguish for injury
to another but rather for being subjected to a traumatic ordeal. Clomon v. Monroe City
Sch. Bd., 572 So. 2d 571, 579 (La. 1990) (Hall, J., concurring).
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a third person and the plaintiff suffers mental anguish as a result, Article
2315.6 is inapplicable as it applies only to bystander recovery. These are
not bystander situations, and thus traditional rules apply. A plaintiff must
prove that the defendant owed him an independent, direct duty, that the
defendant breached that duty, and that the plaintiff's mental anguish is
genuine. The plaintiffs in Clomon and Guillory had a cause of action
for the negligent infliction of emotional distress caused by the defendants'
breach of duty. This breach of duty resulted in their involvement in an
accident which injured a third person. Plaintiffs in similar situations today,
such as our motorist, continue to have such a cause of action, and that
cause of action has not been affected by the enactment of Louisiana
Civil Code article 2315.6.
Cullen J. Dupuy

